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DIFFERENCES IN TEMPERAMENT AMONG SOVIET LEADERS AS SHOWN BY THEIR APPROACH TO POLICY ISSUES 1945 - 1957

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DIFFERENCES IN TEMPERAMENT AMONG SOVIET LEADERS AS SHOWN BY THEIR APPROACH TO POLICY ISSUES 1945 - 1957

FOREWORD

This working paper is an attempt to determine the personal predictions and policy leanings of top-level Soviet leaders by analysis of the part they played in various post-war policy disputes. The approach is a new one, and the findings are preliminary.

The July 1957 upheaval in the Kremlin, resulting in the fall of Molotov, Kaganovich, Malenkov and Shepilov, represented an unusually dramatic moment in a long series of postwar disputes in the Kremlin. As in past climaxes, hierarchical movement was expressed in terms of policies espoused or opposed, even though the motivating forces may have been personal ambition, rivalries or revenge. Thus, although Khrushchev's real purpose in June 1957 may well have been the ultimate elimination of potential rivals for power, the charges he brought against Molotov, Kaganovich, Malenkov and Shepilov made explicit reference to policies which these men had espoused. The victims, in their turn, undoubtedly had their own personal reasons for identifying themselves with a movement against Khrushchev, but they chose selected policies as the instruments through which to convey their opposition.

A review of those postwar turning points on which there is some fragmentary information suggests that, whatever their reasons, most of the ranking members of the Soviet hierarchy have shown a certain consistency in the types of policies they espoused and in the priority each seemed to assign to various policy goals. There is little evidence of stable cliques or personal loyalties among the top leadership. The picture suggested is of temporary alliances among individuals whose immediate interests or personal tendencies coincided for a time, the composition of the alliances changing as the major issues changed.

Over a period of years, individuals develop patterns of thought, basic assumptions, on which their decisions are based. In the Soviet leadership these patterns represent at most differences in temperament and operate only within the very narrow limits of the common aims of the group. The question in the Kremlin is not "what is Communism and do we want to build it or something else," but merely "which is the best way to build Communism." The existence of these differences in temperament is recognized in most political systems, the labels varying according to the type of system or the degree of opprobrium the speaker wishes to impute. In the West there are reactionaries and radicals, conservatives and liberals, while Marxism has its dogmatists, revisionists, right-wing and left-wing deviationists. The Western pragmatist or moderate and the Marxist-Leninist who has "acceptance" at a given time provide the pivot points from which the ends of the spectrum are measured. All these labels change in policy content, however, as the pivot points change--a "liberal" position of one period may be a "conservative" position 20 years later. In the USSR the problem of accuracy in labels is further complicated by the Communists' own usage of the terms. Their insistence that

a Marxist-Leninist position is both infallible and stable in content, and their resulting compulsion to re-label each time the political wind shifts, make the terms extremely difficult for a Westerner to use with any consistency.

Despite these shifting values for political labels, there are some threads of consistency in these differences in temperament. In its time, a policy position may generally be adjudged either cautious or venturesome in the light of the common aims of the leadership group.

Caution dictates attention to possible losses, to risks entailed. It is wary of the new or the untried, "the time is not yet ripe" for change and "a bird in the hand is worth two in the bush." The venturesome are more optimistic, seeing possible gains, not possible losses. They are more impatient with flaws, more self-confident in advancing new panaceas. They prefer a head-on attack on a problem, to the maneuvering of the cautious.

Individual political leaders will not be found on the extreme ends of this spectrum, but they will generally tend toward one side more than another. They are entirely consistent in conforming to these types, particularly because a leaning toward internationalism on the one hand or isolationism on the other may cause either the cautious or the venturesome to find strange political bedfellows. The pragmatist is usually in a moderate position between the two extremes but also--being basically eclectic in political ideas--may pick up concrete beliefs or stands from either or both extremes and demonstrates his middle-of-the-road character merely by the logical inconsistency of his views.

The following study is an attempt to identify what the Chinese Communists are pleased to call the "tone of work" of certain Soviet leaders, past and present, as reflected in the policies with which they have been identified from 1945 to 1956. It is limited in scope to those policies on which information is available concerning identification of individuals, and to those individuals so identified, and should in no way be considered an attempted survey of significant policy problems, study of succession in the Kremlin or postwar history of the USSR. There are gaps in the names, important individuals are missing and the information on those that are listed is incomplete. It is offered only as a first approach, to be added to or corrected as additional information comes to light. Identification of individuals with policies in each case is made very tentatively, with the full recognition that an individual's decision on a given issue might be influenced by

his special departmental or functional responsibilities, the current personality situation in the Kremlin, or even what he had for breakfast.

Disputes During Stalin's Lifetime

There were seven major policy divergences or differences of view on which we have evidence in the postwar Stalin period, 1945-1953, some of which carry over in one form or another into the post-Stalin period:

1. Varga: A major question confronting Soviet leaders in 1945-46 was the evaluation of the remaining enemy's strength, that of postwar capitalism. The Hungarian economist, Varga, cautioned that there was life in the old dog yet. He insisted that capitalism had undergone mutations under the stress of World War II which would enable it to delay a major economic crisis, and to control its inherent tendency toward internecine wars. In addition, he warned that these mutations had shifted political balances in capitalism both between classes and between colonial powers and their colonies, narrowing the field of opportunity for Communist revolutionary activity aimed at overthrowing the existing governments. No ranking Soviet leader took part publicly in the 1947 debate on Varga's views. Public opposition was expressed chiefly by other economists on doctrinal grounds. However, Mikoyan is reported to have taken a position in 1947 very similar to Varga's on the economic strength of capitalism. Varga himself seemed to believe that Zhdanov was behind his doctrinal critics, and Molotov is reported to have expected both an imminent economic failure and internal strife between national imperialist interests to rend capitalism.

2. Stripping: The evaluation of capitalist strength was at issue in Soviet economic policy in occupied areas. One group favored a postwar policy of the economic stripping of all occupied territories for the rebuilding of Soviet industries. This denuding of occupied areas could only have made sense if it were premised on caution in the face of a still relatively strong and cohesive capitalism, and if it were to be followed by withdrawal of Soviet forces to the borders of the USSR for consolidation at home. A leaning toward isolationism would also have dictated withdrawal behind the walls of Soviet borders, in preference to entanglement with foreigners in Germany, Hungary, Manchuria et al. Malenkov and Saburov were reportedly among the supporters of this policy, which appeared to have been based on articles written by Varga in 1943.

Opponents of the stripping policy who apparently envisioned, instead of withdrawal, the permanent annexation of the occupied territories reportedly included Zhdanov, Mikoyan, Zhukov and Voznesensky.

3. Marshall Plan Participation: The question in the spring of 1947 of participation by the Soviet bloc in the Marshall Plan again raised the problems of evaluating the enemy's strength and of the desirability of foreign entanglements. Mikoyan and Kaganovich reportedly favored participation. Molotov is alleged to have opposed it, expecting the failure of the plan. A similar position might be inferred for Zhdanov in view of his apparent refusal to accept Varga's warning of capitalist resilience,

4. Voznesensky: Voznesensky and his supporters appear to have believed that both the Soviet economic situation and the international situation in 1948 were sufficiently favorable to allow added emphasis in the economy on consumer goods. There is some evidence as to the names of both his supporters and his opponents, but little or none as to their reasons for adherence or opposition.

In late 1948, however, Voznesensky's policy of shifting Soviet economic resources to beef up consumer goods production must have appeared as a distinctly risky gamble to the more "cautious" Kremlinites who had accepted Varga's estimate of capitalist resilience. To the more "venturesome" who saw a capitalism rent internally as the only external threat, the risk must have seemed small in comparison to the possible gains in a more balanced economy.

Voznesensky's supporters appear to have included Ostrovityanov, G. Kozlov, Shepilov and Kosyachenko. He was apparently opposed by Malenkov, Saburov, Suslov and V. S. Kruzhkov.

5. Link vs. Brigade: The link vs. brigade controversy in early 1950 involved a question of the size of work-teams in agriculture, the smaller link providing for a greater degree of personal identification for the individual worker with the total results of his labor but without the mechanization which the brigade was designed to promote. Andreev, in confessing his error in retaining the link system instead of adopting the brigade, noted that his major concern had been production, a cautious "bird in the hand approach." His anonymous critic in Pravda, who may possibly have been Khrushchev, insisted that the correct organization of labor was not only a "technical-production" matter, but also a most important "economic-

political" task. A temporary decline in production coupled with increased investment was worth risking if it resulted in a more politically orthodox organizational form--which doctrine promised would be more efficient in the end--and if it promoted mechanization.

6. Agrogoroda: The theme of impatience, acceptance of a gamble and belief in "bigness" in agriculture was clearer still in the agrogorod campaign of 1950-1951. In its full bloom the plan, clearly sparked by Khrushchev, involved the merging of smaller adjoining collective farms and the resettlement of the farm workers in farm-cities, with apartments, shops and all the amenities of town life, but cutting their ties with the land. The scheme involved both enormous expense and major disruption of traditionally conservative peasants, with the risk of production losses. In the spring of 1951 it was attacked by Arutinov, a Beria protegé, as doctrinaire and premature, and by Bagirov, also a Beria protegé, as hindering the private-plot farming of the peasants. It was again criticized as premature during the 19th party congress in October 1952 by Malenkov and Arutinov.

7. East Germany: There appears to have been a possible correlation in timing between the varying speeds of socialization in East Germany from 1945 to 1953 and the shifting Kremlin estimate of Western strength. During periods when the resilience of capitalism seemed to be accepted, as reflected in the stripping policy, or the 1949 emphasis on heavy industry, the pace of socialization was slow. When capitalist strength seemed to be in doubt, the pace was increased. In addition to the cautious or venturesome approach to the problem of estimating Western strength, a leaning toward internationalism or isolationism may have been a factor in any evaluation of policy for East Germany. The greater the degree of socialization, the greater the Soviet stake in a land which did not even adjoin Soviet borders.

Fragmentary evidence suggests that Zhdanov may have favored a fast socialization pace while Beria and Malenkov seemed to advocate a slower pace.

Dispute in the Post-Stalin Period

By 1953 when Stalin died, the major postwar issue of the relative strength or weakness of capitalism vis-a-vis the USSR had been more or less shelved, in the face of the more pressing problems of rigidity in the Soviet system. The venturesome became less expansionist in international terms and more inclinedto take the risks entailed in relaxing international tensions, to gamble possible short-range losses in discipline

and "face" against possible long-range gains in dynamism. With the growth of the "camp of socialism," questions of allegiance to the USSR began to come to the fore. Problems of dogma also moved to the forefront with the removal of a supreme arbiter. The collective leadership which succeeded Stalin had a wealth of prophets, four dead and at least five living ones, but no one authority to judge whether a given concession or a given tactic actually contravened doctrine or was merely a creative application of it. The major policy divergencies or differences of view became more frequent and the evidence about the leanings of leaders toward one or another solution became more plentiful. There are at least 14* policy issues worth examining in the 1953-1957 period:

8. Consumer Goods Program - 1954: There appears to have been general agreement within the leadership groups in mid-1953 that some additional emphasis must be given in the economy to the production of consumer goods. As stresses developed in the economy due to the concurrent growth of other programs, the issue became one of degree of enthusiasm for a given program. There was some difference in phrasing, in the degree of enthusiasm shown for the consumer goods program, evident in speeches made by the leadership group over the 18-month period from August 1953 when the program was announced to early February 1955 when Malenkov resigned.

Among the less enthusiastic speakers were Voroshilov, Molotov, Kaganovich and, toward the end of the 18 months, Khrushchev and Shepilov. The enthusiasts appeared to include Malenkov, Khrushchev in the early months of the program and Kosygin, Saburov, Pervukhin and Mikoyan.

9. Virgin Lands Program: There were two possible approaches to the agricultural problem which the Soviet leadership faced in 1953--either intensified cultivation of the traditional farming areas involving long-term investment and producing a gradual but sure rise in production, or the expansion of agriculture into areas regarded as marginal land, also expensive in its investment demands, a gamble on the uncontrollable factor of weather, but promising a big increase in

* Four are grouped under the heading "20th Party Congress."

production quickly if the scheme were successful. The latter program in the virgin lands was clearly Khrushchev's own creation. There is some evidence that he was supported by Mikoyan and possibly Kaganovich, and opposed by Malenkov and Molotov.

10. Nuclear Warfare: During the winter and early spring of 1954, there appeared a series of varying formulations in public speeches by Soviet leaders which seemed to reflect their attempts to grapple with the implications of nuclear warfare. These variations were played on three themes--the destructiveness of nuclear warfare, estimates of the imminence of war, and the slice of the economy to be devoted to defense needs. Malenkov, in the "death of civilization" and the "defense needs" themes, appeared to feel that the destructiveness of nuclear weapons was so great as to eliminate war as a feasible instrument of foreign policy for either side. Accordingly, defense needs did not loom large in his speeches. Mikoyan explicitly stated that the danger of war had decreased, a position close to Malenkov's in its implications for defense needs. Pospelov combined the two themes, seeing a decrease in the likelihood of war and congratulating Soviet scientists on not working for the "destruction of world civilization." Bulganin made an oblique and critical reference to these formulations, warning that the USSR could not count on the humaneness of the imperialists not to use weapons of mass destruction, and three months later sounded an unprecedented warning on the danger of surprise attack from the US. Khrushchev and Kaganovich both cited the continuing danger of capitalist encirclement, the first such references since Stalin's death. Molotov and Voroshilov at the opposite end of the spectrum from Malenkov appeared to be saying that nuclear destruction did not represent a new factor in world politics and that a third war would still mean only the "death of capitalism." Khrushchev, Bulganin and Kaganovich combined with Molotov and Voroshilov in calling for further defense expenditures. Pervukhin and Saburov had not contributed to the nuclear destruction and the imminence of war themes, but like Malenkov were notable in their lack of concern for defense expenditures.

11. China: Certain Soviet leaders seem to have been more closely and continuously identified with Chinese affairs than others, and there are faint hints that internationalist or isolationist leanings might have affected their willingness to delay achievement of a goal in the USSR for the greater good of fraternal China. In 1949, the year of the Chinese Communist victory, Molotov, Khrushchev and Mikoyan were noted as the regulars at Chinese Communist embassy receptions in Moscow, and in 1950 Molotov and Khrushchev publicly expressed much greater enthusiasm for the recent Chinese Communist victory than did Malenkov, Kosygin, Suslov and Beria.

The soul-searching by the Soviet leadership in 1954 on the implications of nuclear warfare took place six months after the Korean war had been cooled off to a truce, at a time when shots fired in anger between communism and capitalism were being heard only in Indochina. The United States was publicly considering entering that war to back the French, the Chinese Communists were already deeply committed to the Viet Minh in at last pushing the ten-year-old war to a victorious conclusion. Sino-Soviet defense treaty obligations confronted the Kremlin in early 1954 with a very pressing need to evaluate the implications of a possible nuclear war spreading outward from the Communist Chinese gamble in Indochina. When read with these Far Eastern echoes, Malenkov's "death of civilization" speech seemed a warning that the risk of a major nuclear war was too great, Mikoyan's estimate of decreasing danger of war a calming assurance that the Chinese Communist gamble would pay off and that a world war would not develop, and Molotov's and Voroshilov's "death of capitalism" theme still further assurance of backing in a gamble which did not seem to them to risk fatal consequences.

12. Economic Aid to China: There were also faint hints in the summer of 1954 that there were differences of degree among the Soviet leaders concerning the amount of economic aid that should be spared to Communist China. Bulganin, Khrushchev and Mikoyan were the bearers of glad tidings to the fraternal Chinese in October 1954. The Soviet premier, Malenkov, and the Soviet foreign minister, Molotov, were notably absent. There had been an unusually cool exchange of telegrams between Malenkov and Mao a month earlier (2 September), traditionally a day for warm affirmations of unity and mutual respect. And in July 1955 Mikoyan is reported to have enlivened an official censure of Molotov with charges of past Soviet "meanness" in the economic exploitation of other socialist countries, citing an offer concerning joint stock companies which Mao had turned down.

13. Aid to Underdeveloped Countries: In early 1955 a change was apparent in Soviet foreign aid policies. Emphasis was shifted from Eastern Europe to the Middle East and the tempo was sharply increased. There had been sporadic reports of offers to "excolonial countries" even before Stalin's death, but it was not until shortly after Malenkov's removal from the post of premier and the accession of the B & K team to power that the program really took shape. Since that time, Bulganin, Khrushchev, Mikoyan and Shepilov have been most closely identified in public with the program. There are no reports on the subject, but on the basis of Molotov's reluctance to accept the

"new flexible" Soviet foreign policy, of which the economic aid program was an important instrument, and his apparent economic "meanness" in Eastern Europe, it might be inferred that he, like Malenkov, dragged his feet on the program.

14. Relaxation of International Tension - 1955: The spring of 1955 was marked by at least four moves by the USSR designed to relax international tension. The Austrian treaty was signed, a new disarmament package proposal was produced, the mountain went to Mohammed in Belgrade, and to a meeting at the Summit in Geneva. According to most reports, a hard core of resistance to these moves was provided by Molotov and Voroshilov and aided occasionally by "others," unnamed. These two had felt that nuclear destruction did not represent a new factor in world politics and threatened only the death of capitalism. Bulganin, Khrushchev, Mikoyan and "the new members of the central committee" reportedly provided the impetus for change and Shepilov and Suslov appear sporadically in this latter group.

15. Relaxation in Eastern Europe - 1955: During the summer and fall of 1955, the problem of Soviet control in Eastern Europe, having escaped from Pandora's box in Belgrade, arose to haunt the Kremlin. The reports of justification and recrimination during this period show Molotov and Voroshilov justifying past Stalinist harshness and filled with foreboding concerning a future in which the "doctrinally impure" Yugoslavia might infect Eastern Europe Satellites. As in the spring relaxation moves, the impetus for change continued to be provided by Bulganin, Khrushchev and Mikoyan. Kaganovich, Suslov and Shepilov are occasionally reported as allies of the latter group.

16. 20th Party Congress: There was, of course, no open disagreement at the 20th party congress in February 1956. There were, however, certain differences in emphasis by individual speakers, apparently reflecting their primary interests and their mental reservations. The four major themes were the denunciation of Stalin's practices in his later years, the possibility of cooperation in the socialist camp despite differing views on forms of transition to socialism, the possibility of averting war, and the possibility in certain countries of a transition to socialism through parliamentary means without civil war. The general effect was of enthusiasm on the part of Khrushchev and Mikoyan, obedient if uninspired support from Bulganin, spotty support from Suslov, Shvernik and Shepilov, and foot dragging from Kaganovich, Molotov and Voroshilov. Malenkov, depending on the subject, ranged from enthusiasm to complete disinterest.

17. Stalinism vs. The Thaw - 1956: By mid-1956, there appear to have been three groups in the leadership, differing in the degree of confidence with which they faced the need for a change from Stalinism in the satellites. Mikoyan and, according to one report, Mukhitdinov and Satyukov, who succeeded Shepilov as editor of Pravda, led in enthusiasm, envisioning still further changes. Bulganin and Khrushchev occupied a middle position, reportedly hedging to the Yugoslavs on the amount of independent action to be allowed in the future to European satellites, although he had promised a great deal earlier, while Molotov, Kaganovich, Malenkov, Voroshilov, Suslov and Pospelov viewed the liberalization already accomplished with the gravest foreboding.

18. Anti-Semitism and Great Russianism: There have been recurring themes throughout Russian history. Zhdanov, Voznesensky, A.A. Kuznetsov, Ryumin, and among the survivors, Khrushchev and Furtseva, have been charged with anti-semitic prejudices. Beria, Abakumov, Malenkov, Molotov, Mikoyan, Kaganovich and Pervukhin reportedly either have Jewish ties or have shown a lack of prejudice.

Zhdanov has been identified [redacted] with Great Russian "chauvinism," while Beria, Kaganovich, Mikoyan and probably Khrushchev have shown greater or lesser degrees of sympathy for national minorities.

SUMMATION

	VENTURESOME	CAUTIOUS
1. Varga 1945-6	Con Zhdanov Molotov	Pro Mikoyan
2. Stripping 1946	Con-Internationalist Zhdanov Mikoyan Zhukov Voznesensky	Pro-Isolationist Malenkov Saburov
3. Marshall Plan 1947	Con-Isolationist Molotov Zhdanov?	Pro-Internationalist Mikoyan Kaganovich

	VENTURESOME	CAUTIOUS
4. Voznesensky 1949	Pro	Con
	Voznesensky Shepilov	Malenkov Saburov Suslov
5. Link vs. Brigade 1950	Brigade	Link
	Khrushchev?	Andreev
6. Agrogoroda 1950-51	Pro	Con
	Khrushchev	Beria Bagirov Malenkov
7. E. German socialization 1945-1953	Fast-Internationalist	Slow-Isolationist
	Zhdanov	Beria Malenkov
8. Consumer goods program 1954	More-Isolationist	Less-Internationalist
	Malenkov Khrushchev Kosygin Saburov Pervukhin Mikoyan	Voroshilov Molotov Kaganovich Khrushchev Shepilov
9. Virgin lands 1954	Pro	Con
	Khrushchev Mikoyan Kaganovich?	Malenkov Molotov
10. Nuclear Warfare	Unimpressed	Impressed
	Molotov Voroshilov Khrushchev Bulganin Kaganovich	Pospelov Malenkov Mikoyan Pervukhin Saburov
11. China	Pro	Con
	Molotov Khrushchev Mikoyan Bulganin Voroshilov	Malenkov Kosygin Suslov Beria

	VENTURESOME	CAUTIOUS
12. Economic aid 1955	More-Internationalist Khrushchev Bulganin Mikoyan	Less-Isolationist Malenkov Molotov
13. Aid to Underdeveloped Countries 1955	Pro-Internationalist Bulganin Khrushchev Mikoyan Shepilov	Con-Isolationist Malenkov? Molotov?
14. Relaxation of International Tension 1955	Pro-Internationalist Khrushchev Bulganin Mikoyan Shepilov Suslov	Con-Isolationist Molotov Voroshilov Kaganovich? Malenkov?
15. Relaxation in Eastern Europe 1955	Pro-Internationalist Bulganin Khrushchev Mikoyan Kaganovich? Suslov? Shepilov?	Con-Isolationist Molotov Voroshilov

16. 20th Party Congress 1956	More	Same	Less
a. Denunciation of Stalin	Mikoyan Khrushchev Suslov	Malenkov Molotov Bulganin Shvernik	Kaganovich Voroshilov

	Enthusiastic	Accepted	With Reservations Or Ignored
b. Different Roads to Socialism	Khrushchev Shepilov	Bulganin Mikoyan	Kaganovich Molotov Malenkov Suslov

	VENTURESOME		CAUTIOUS
c. Possibility of Averting War	Enthusiastic	Accepted	With Reservations Or Ignored
	Khrushchev Mikoyan Malenkov	Bulganin Molotov	Kaganovich Shepilov Suslov
d. Parliamentary Transition to Socialism	Khrushchev Mikoyan Shepilov	Bulganin Kaganovich	Molotov Malenkov Suslov
17. Liberalization in EE 1956	Enthusiastic	Accepted	Resisted
	Mikoyan Mukhitdinov?	Khrushchev Bulganin	Molotov Kaganovich Malenkov Voroshilov Suslov Pospelov
18. Anti-Semitism and/or Great-Russianism	Present		Lacking
	Zhdanov Voznesensky Khrushchev Furtseva		Malenkov Mikoyan Molotov Kaganovich Pervukhin Beria

Tendencies of Individual Leaders

19. Zhdanov: Zhdanov's policy preferences in the postwar years suggest him as the prototype of the "venturesome." Optimistic and confident, the prizes far outweighed the risks which in his eyes seemed small. He saw no reason to fear serious resistance or reprisal from capitalism and the question of a major war between the two systems seemed irrelevant. Internal capitalist strife had already knocked out two major power centers in Europe and Asia and had seriously weakened others. Grave economic problems, national antagonisms, colonial strife, and class conflicts were inherent in the enemy, to be manipulated by communism as the executive of the future.

> The sacrifices and dislocations caused by the unprecedented war, the victories scored over Hitler's Germany and imperialist Japan have brought about a new political situation all over the world, stirred up the masses of the peoples, raised their political activity and given a powerful impetus to the development of democracy in all countries... /Yugoslavia, Poland, Italy, Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary and Finland were cited as part of this progress/ Further it should not be forgotten that the defeat of the Conservatives and the victory of the Labor party in Britain, like the defeat of the reactionaries and the victory of the bloc of Left parties in France, signify a considerable move to the left in these countries. (Nov 1946)
>
> It should be borne in mind that America herself is threatened by an economic crisis. There are weighty reasons for Marshall's generosity. If the European countries do not receive American credits, their demands for American goods will diminish and this will tend to accelerate and intensify the approaching economic crisis.... The main danger to the working class at the present time stems from underestimation of its own strength and overestimation of that of the enemy. (Sept 1947)

The Cassandras who warned of lessons learned and changes accomplished in capitalism, of the possibility of serious resistance from the enemy, spoke to deaf ears. Confidence in the ability of a dynamic socialism to predict and to control the "objective" factors of its world keynoted his policy preferences and his speeches.

Whether he was the initiator or not, Zhdanov was clearly the executor for the ideological purity campaigns in philosophy, art, literature and music from 1946 until his death in mid-1948. Art forms must be intelligible to the masses but more important, must be imbued with optimism. Socialist culture would, of course, prevail because of its inherently greater worth. It was not foreignness which was to be guarded against but pessimism, a most antisocialist characteristic.

> The task of Soviet literature is to help the state correctly to educate the youth, cater to its needs, rear the younger generation to be buoyant, confident in its cause, undaunted by difficulties, and prepared to surmount all obstacles. (Aug 1946)

His optimism and confidence in the ability of socialist man to control his environment by planning extended even to science, and he provided the seed, although not necessarily the savagery of tone, for the ideological campaigns which raged in scientific fields after his death. In his 1947 criticism of G. F. Alexandrov's history of philosophy, he referred scathingly to the "Kantian subterfuges of contemporary bourgeois atomic physicists (which) lead them to deductions of the "free will" of the electron and to attempts to represent matter as only some combination of waves and other such nonsense."

Since he rejected Varga's warnings on the postwar resilience of capitalism, he also opposed the stripping policy and its premised Soviet withdrawal from those areas. His original opposition to Marshall Plan participation has only been inferred, but he was again clearly the executor for the Soviet riposte, the formation of the Cominform; and the wave of strikes in France and Italy which followed in the autumn of 1947 is generally associated with his influence. If the inference of his opposition to the Marshall Plan is correct, it could only have been due to his expectation that it would fail, for there is no hint in any of his speeches or in the part of his career covered here of any isolationism.

The roster of Communist leaders gathered under his leadership in Warsaw in September 1947 is striking for the number of "national" Communists included. His speeches on nationalism suggest that his loyalties and his trust ran along class lines, regarding national boundaries as only administrative conveniences and not as divisive in interests.

> The wise foreign policy of Stalin... has taken the Soviet Union out of isolation and has created and solidified the bloc of peaceful nations. (Feb 1946)

> Internationalism in art does not develop on the basis of a contraction and in impoverishment of national art. Rather, internationalism flourishes where national art flowers. To forget this is to lose one's individuality and become a cosmopolitan without a country. It is impossible to be an internationalist in music or anything else, without being a real patriot of one's fatherland. (Feb 1948) Only the new Russians who are not burdened down by the long series of scholastic periods of the Europe of previous centuries are able to look science full in the face; they honor it and make use of its blessings, but they do so without exaggerated deference to it. (Feb 1948)

Zhdanov died before the limits of his optimism and internationalism could be gauged--before it was evident that the Marshall Plan had "delayed" an economic crisis in the West, before the establishment of NATO underlined Varga's warning that wars between capitalist states were not inevitable, before the problem of national Communism reached the boiling point of an open break with Tito and began a wide swath of purges among the Satellite leaders in the Cominform.

Since he departed from the Soviet scene an optimist apparently unsullied by second thoughts and forced retreats, his name has continued a rallying cry for the venturesome in times of stress. He and Shcherbakov figured in the World War II rolls of honor with Bulganin and Khrushchev in 1954 and 1955. He was quoted, though not by name, in the Kommunist reprimand to Malenkov's "death of civilization" formulation in March 1954.

20. Voznesensky: Voznesensky's postwar career was a short one, lasting only three years. During that time, however, he was quite clearly identifiable with venturesome tendencies. One of his closest colleagues, Ostrovityanov, was a critic of Varga, both Voznesensky and Ostrovityanov opposed the stripping policy of retreat from occupied territories, and both appear to have been in the vanguard of the movement to complete the Five-Year Plan in four years, Voznesensky as the head of GOSPLAN and Ostrovityanov in providing the theoretical rationale. Like Zhdanov, Voznesensky appears to have become a symbol of enthusiasm and confidence--indeed overconfidence in the eyes of the cautious. (It might be noted that the tie between Zhdanov and Voznesensky was apparently a strong one. Voznesensky and his fellow-victim in the Leningrad affair, A. A. Kuznetsov, were the two who accompanied Zhdanov's body when it was sent to Moscow by train to the funeral.) Malenkov made several unkind comments on "enthusiasm" which may well have referred to Voznesensky.

> Exaggeration is a human feeling. There are comrades among us who suffer from this vice. These people cannot admire anything without gushing. They are incapable of simultaneously appreciating an achievement at its true worth and noticing the shortcomings in order to remove them. (Nov 1949)

> The facts show that successes have generated in the ranks of the party a mood of self-satisfaction, a pretense of well-being and smug complacency, a desire to rest on one's laurels and rely on past merits. No few officials have appeared who think that "we can do anything," "everying is child's play to us," "things are going well" and there is no use worrying oneself with such a disagreeable task as disclosing defects and mistakes in the work or combating negative and unhealthy phenomena in our organization. (19th party congress)

Stalin was even more pointed on the same occasion, flatly contradicting one of Voznesensky's theses, though without naming his victim, and adding:

> We, as the leading core, are joined each year by thousands of new young cadres, fired with the desire to help us, eager to prove themselves

> but lacking an adequate Marxist education, uninformed of many truths well known to us and thus obliged to wander in the dark.... They begin to imagine that the Soviet regime "can do anything" and "everything is child's play to it," that it can refute scientific laws and fashion new ones.

21. Malenkov: If Zhdanov was the prototype of the venturesome internationalist, Malenkov appears as his complete opposite, a cautious isolationist. His stand on Varga's warnings has not figured in [redacted] but Varga has generally been regarded as Malenkov's protegé, and Malenkov was identified with the policy corollary to Varga's estimate of capitalist resilience, the economic stripping of occupied areas. His stand on Marshall Plan participation would have depended on whether his fear of the West was stronger than his desire to strengthen the homeland through its economic benefits. His part in the violent reaction against Voznesensky's program suggests that fear may have been uppermost in his mind at least as early as September 1947 when he first used the formulation which was to signal priority for heavy industry. Fear runs through his early postwar speeches in curious contrast to Zhdanov's buoyant confidence.

> In the recent period the party had to wage a resolute struggle against various manifestations of an obsequious and servile attitude toward Western bourgeois culture.... The party had to deal a resolute blow against several specific manifestations of this attitude since these manifestations represent, in the present stage, a serious danger to the interests of the Soviet state, inasmuch as the agents of international reaction, in order to weaken the Soviet state, seek to utilize people infected with a feeling of servility toward bourgeois culture.... /Compare with Zhdanov's confidence six months later in 1948 that Russians would know how to use the good and discard the bad./ The survivals of these old capitalist conceptions are being used today by agents of American and British imperialism who spare no effort in their attempt to find within the USSR support for their espionage and their anti-Soviet propaganda. The agents of foreign espionage services are bending every effort to

> seek out weak and vulnerable points among certain unstable sections of our intelligentsia who still bear the stamp of the old lack of faith in their own forces and are infected with the disease of servility to everything foreign. (Sept 1947)

If a consumer goods program in addition to other demands on the economy was too risky in 1948 and 1949, with the West showing signs of resilience and a Soviet military re-equipment program to be undertaken, the agrogorod scheme of 1950-1951 was equally premature in Malenkov's eyes. And, like Beria, he seems to have been reluctant during these years to push socialization in East Germany. How much of this was due merely to a personal sense of timing, a distaste for drastic and possibly disruptive measures and how much to a belief that Soviet withdrawal might some day be necessary or advisable is impossible to judge with any degree of accuracy. According [redacted] Malenkov was charged in January 1955 with having agreed to Beria's proposal to allow German reunification as a bourgeois democracy. This may have been an effort by his enemies to put the worst possible face on what was no more than caution. On the other hand Malenkov's speeches, more than those of any other leader, have shown a strong sense of the physical entity of Russia.

> We should remember that we are sufficiently strong to defend the interests of our people. We have won a victory and want to protect our Motherland from any eventuality whatsoever. We do not want to pull the chestnuts out of the fire for others. If there are chestnuts available we will use them for the good of our glorious Soviet people... (Feb 1946)

> The October Revolution liberated the peoples of Russia from economic and spiritual enslavement to foreign capital. Soviet power has for the first time made our country a free and independent state. (Sept 1947). Never in the history of our country have the peoples inhabiting its vast expanses been so closely united.... Never in all its history has our country had such just, well-ordered state frontiers as it now has.... Never before in all its history has our country been surrounded with neighboring countries so friendly to our state. (Nov 1949)

We would not have achieved the successes in peaceful construction in which we now take pride if we had permitted the weakening of our state. If we had not strengthened our state, our army, our punitive and intelligence agencies, we should have been unarmed in the face of our enemies and confronted by the danger of a military defeat. The party turned the Soviet country into an impregnable fortress of socialism by strengthening the socialist state in every way and it is continuing to strengthen it. (19 party congress) Certain officials, absorbed in economic affairs and achievements, begin to forget that the capitalist encirclement still exists and that the enemies of the Soviet state are persistently trying to smuggle in their agents and utilize unstable elements in Soviet society for their own vile ends. (ibid) In the northwest we have new frontiers, more just and corresponding better to the interests of the defense of the country.... Today the state frontiers of the Soviet Union correspond best to the historically evolved conditions of the development of the peoples of our country. (ibid)

If cautious isolationism characterized Malenkov's career under Stalin, it was still more apparent under the "collective leadership." By 1953 it seems to have been generally agreed within the collective leadership that some relaxation of tension was needed both internationally and internally. The consumer goods program at its inception does not appear to have been controversial, and it was not until other demands on the economy in the shape of agricultural and defense needs and foreign aid programs became equally pressing that matters of timing and degree became grounds for differences within the group. As might have been expected, Malenkov appears to have preferred the slower but surer path of further investment in traditional farming areas to the admitted gamble of the virgin lands.

During the 1954 efforts of the group to grapple with the implications of nuclear warfare, his attitude appears to have been that war in a nuclear age was quite literally unthinkable, the risks being too great for either side to allow war to impinge on their consciousness even as a possibility. "War can and must be averted," and backing the Chinese gamble in Indochina was no way to avert it. The defense establishment should be retained at its current strength, but need not affect consumer goods priorities. Equally, foreign aid programs, whether within the camp to fraternal China and the satellites or to purely problematic allies in underdeveloped countries, were all very well, but not until recognized economic imbalances in the consumer goods field at home had been corrected.

Khrushchev has been reported as protesting that Western commentators were misinterpreting Malenkov's fall in February 1955 by overemphasizing the question of consumer goods priority as the deciding factor. And it is quite true that Malenkov's formulations of the consumer goods program were never so gradiose as those of Mikoyan who survived the policy shift relatively unscathed. Even here Malenkov seems to have run true to form in his cautious approach to a recognized need for reform, and in his apparent belief that Russian needs came first.

Malenkov's performance at the 20th party congress was marked by guarded acceptance of de-Stalinization, lack of interest in the progress of socialism outside of Russia, but fervent support for Khrushchev on the subject of avoiding war.

> The supplanting of the capitalist system by a higher social order, socialism, is inevitable. When and how will this take place? What will be the forms of the transition to socialism? It is up to the people of capitalist countries to solve these problems. It is only they who can determine the fate of their states. But, one must time and again draw attention to the most important proposition put forward in the report of Comrade Khrushchev when he confirmed that war is not inevitable. War can and must be prevented.

Certain parallels in timing in the early post-Stalin careers of Malenkov and the Hungarian liberalization symbol, Imre Nagy, have led to speculation identifying Malenkov with early post-Stalin liberalization. Extremes in either direction,

"too rigid" political and economic controls or "too speedy" relaxation seem to have been equally distasteful to Malenkov. Even in the period following Voznesensky's execution with its strong emphasis on heavy industry, Beria by 1951 and Malenkov by 1952 were publicly recognizing the need to redress imbalances in the economy by increased attention to consumer goods. In the case of satellite controls as in the consumer goods problem the need for some relaxation of controls seems to have been generally agreed upon immediately after Stalin's death, and Malenkov may well have backed Nagy's early program.

Malenkov did not appear in the roster of those concerned about the pace of liberalization in Eastern Europe until mid-1956 when he was reported among the cautious foot-dragging group. At this point he was able to attack a powerful rival who had participated in his downfall 18 months before, to do so on a subject which was congenial to him, and to do so, not in suicidal isolation, but with the backing of allies equally concerned about the "risks" they foresaw.

22. Beria: Beria's few appearances in policy issues on the side of cautious isolationism may seem curious for a man with as evil a personal reputation as his. It is possible, however, that his long responsibility for internal security made him aware of the hazards of arousing widespread popular discontent in the USSR and of overextending the Soviet control system in unwilling allies. His opposition to the drastic dislocation of the peasants envisioned in the agrogorod scheme and his respect for their ties to their private plots have already been noted, as has his reluctance to push socialization in East Germany.

Two years after Beria's fall, Molotov was reportedly accused of having tolerated Beria's policy in the DDR "in solving the question of unifying the peasants, with the result that a combination of force and technical unpreparedness" had led to mass flights of farmers to the West.

Joseph Koevago, mayor of Budapest during the October 1956 Hungarian rebellion, reports [redacted] that Beria had personally supervised the replacement of Rakosi by Imre Nagy in the spring 1953 Hungarian liberalization program. Beria reportedly assured Nagy of his personal protection from reprisal by Rakosi. [redacted] noted in connection with Beria's fall that as a result of this struggle for power in Moscow, "Rakosi seized control again after Beria's arrest and repealed the Nagy

reforms." Nagy's program was described as "legality," which had indeed been a keynote of Beria's speech at Stalin's funeral. More far-reaching than prison reforms and amnesties, "legality" in Nagy's and possibly Beria's programs seems to have included lessening of pressures to force the life of the country into the political and economic molds of communism.

The "combination of force and technical unpreparedness" in the DDR with which Beria was charged seems to have described his policy tendencies--ready use of individual terror to deal with flagrant rebelliousness or unrest, but a reluctance to institute further measures--no matter how politically orthodox, efficient or desirable from the point of view of expanding economic and political system of communism--that might disrupt the work and living habits of large sectors of the population. Certainly, the continued existence of private plots in the Soviet economic system constituted "technical unpreparedness" for a hoped-for transition to communism. Similarly a slow socialization policy in East Germany would constitute "technical unpreparedness" for transition to a fully socialist system.

23. Molotov: Molotov's postwar career presents a curious picture of willingness to accept risks of war in the international field but caution in other aspects of policy. The answer to this apparent split personality may be partially in his dependence on "the book," in itself a form of caution in following blindly the "infallible" guidance of another, and partially in his long association with foreign affairs.

Like Zhdanov, he refused to accept Varga's postwar estimate of capitalist strength, insisting that the Marshall Plan would fail because of the inherent weaknesses in capitalism which orthodox doctrine had foreseen. In March 1950 he was still insisting that capitalist economic collapse had actually begun:

> The American figure of minus 22 percent (fall in industrial output 1948-9) testifies to the beginning of an economic crisis in the United States and at the same time to the crisis which mounts in all capitalist countries.

Mikoyan's formulation on 10 March 1950 made an interesting contrast in its pro forma reference to "inevitability" but with escape clauses:

> The newly invented talisman for the struggle against crises so inevitable under capitalism and the reassuring assertions of the ruling circles only temporarily can produce but an appearance of relief and only temporarily contain the panic and fear of the consequences of the crisis.

Molotov and Kaganovich were the only speakers at the 19th party congress in October 1952 who mentioned the late-lamented Zhdanov and Shcherbakov. It is possible that they did so because they gave the ceremonial opening and closing speeches. On the other hand, Zhdanov as the leading post-war exponent of optimism and confidence and a major opponent of Varga's views would have been a natural ally for Molotov on foreign affairs. In addition, the Zhdanov-Shcherbakov combination received heavy emphasis in 1954 apparently as a symbol of orthodoxy in heavy industry and defense needs and acceptance of foreign policy risks when Bulganin, Khrushchev, Molotov and Kaganovich were united in backing this policy complex.

There have been several indirect references to Molotov as a "bookman" Marxist and dogmatist. Malenkov's 19th party congress speech warned that "those who live by rote" as well as those who believe that "we can do everything" would be thrown into the discard by life. Khrushchev in his secret speech noted that Molotov and Mikoyan had been in danger of liquidation in the fall of 1952. The Kommunist editorial in September 1955 which attacked, without naming Molotov, the latter's error of February 1955 concerning the building of socialism in the USSR spoke ominously of the danger of separating theory from practice, of transposing formulas of the distant past to present conditions, and warned that dogmatism is especially inadmissible "in the sphere of international life."

Marxist-Leninist doctrine said nothing about communism gambling on rainfall--Molotov reportedly opposed the virgin lands program. There was no reference in "the book" to new weapons so destructive as to make war a Pyrrhic victory even for the inevitably victorious Soviet Union--Molotov more than any other leader was identified with the "death of capitalism" theme in the spring of 1954 when Chinese Communist adventures in Indochina raised the problem of Soviet treaty obligations to China. His repetition of this theme, together with his promotion of the CPR to co-head of the camp of socialism during the offshore islands tension in February 1955, seems to have served the same purpose of assuring Soviet backing for

the Chinese in a possible war with the US. And since war was still a feasible instrument of foreign policy, defense needs must be met by emphasis on heavy industry.

The September 1955 Kommunist reprimand of Molotov which seems to have evened all sorts of old scores, dealt particularly harshly with Soviet economists who saw "expanded reproduction" replaced by "diminished production" and the "self-strangulation" of modern capitalism.

> Undoubtedly the deepening of the general crisis of the capitalist system bears witness to the further rotting of capitalism, but, as Lenin pointed out, it would be a mistake to think that the tendency to rot excludes the rapid growth of capitalism.

It warned further that such distortions of the integrity of the principles of Marxist tenets leads to conclusions at variance with objective reality and the policy of the party, and for good measure cited the horrible example of the woe-begone economists who drew wrong and politically harmful conclusions in denying the need for preferential development of heavy industry. That this was a far from academic matter is suggested by Mikoyan's speech at the 20th party congress which contained the only substantive criticism of Stalin advanced by an authoritative figure. His criticism was directed at this same thesis of the self-strangulation of capitalism. Molotov, clinging grimly to doctrine, appears to have been still insisting in 1955 that capitalism was on the verge of collapse and that "in order to accomplish something we do not need these new methods of negotiations" such as the Austrian treaty, the new disarmament package proposal, the Yugoslav rapprochement, the Summit meeting, the aid to underdeveloped countries, improved relations with Japan, et al. Acceptance of the risk of a war which communism would inevitably win was right and proper. But taking one step backward, in relaxing international tension, in order to take two forward was a recommended technique only in the face of strong opposition, and his faith in the imminent crisis of capitalism was undimmed.

In addition to being cautious and doctrinaire even to the extent of accepting grave risks of war, Molotov seems to have been strongly isolationist. There is a suggestion of this in the Kommunist editorial which warned that the problems of building communism in the USSR cannot be considered separately from the problems connected with the camp of socialism. To this was added a

call for "tolerance on all matters touching on radical questions of principle on Marxist-Leninist ideology and policy" and recognition of national peculiarities and differences in rates of transition to socialism.

Like Malenkov, his early postwar speeches suggest a distrust of foreignness.

> Of course, acquaintance with the life of other nations will certainly be of benefit to our people and will broaden their outlook. It is interesting, however, that Soviet people return home with even more ardent feelings of loyalty to their homeland and the Soviet system. (Nov 1945) Not all of us have yet rid ourselves of obsequious worship of the West, of capitalist culture. It was not for nothing that the ruling class of old Russia were often in a state of such profound spiritual dependence on the capitalistically more highly developed countries of Europe.... Unless one rids oneself of these shameful survivals, one cannot be a real Soviet citizen. That is why our Soviet people are filled with such resolute determination to put an end as quickly as possible to these survivals from the past, mercilessly to criticize all and every manifestation of obsequious worship of the West and of its capitalist culture. (Nov 1947)

This isolation had a different slant, however, from that of Malenkov who seems to have been genuinely disinterested in progress outside Russian borders. For Molotov, possibly because of his foreign policy responsibility, an increase in the size of the Soviet empire was to be hailed with rejoicing but only as an added field for exploitation for the homeland, not as an ally to be strengthened in its own right.

He may have "tolerated Beria's policy" in the DDR because internal policy in East Germany was not his direct responsibility, but on the subject of East Germany vis-a-vis the West, his stand was unequivocal. On 16 October 1954 in an unusually explicit speech he said:

> The development of the DDR has been so planned that it must become an integral part of the socialist bloc, while at the same time guaranteeing a peaceful existence to a large part of Germany.

His opposition to liberalization in the satellites in 1955 and 1956 which had been referred to in the Kommunist editorial seemed to be based on the same principal--j'y suis, j'y reste.

The 1955 charges against Molotov concerning the insolence of Soviet diplomats and the suggestions that Molotov was being held responsible, at least in part, for past economic exploitation of the fraternal satellites and attempts to do so in Communist China have already been noted.

At the 20th party congress, Molotov was among the more temperate speakers concerning the "great harm" caused by certain "abnormalities" in Stalin's later years. He apparently could not bring himself to discuss the possibility of parliamentary transition to socialism, contended that national characteristics had from the beginning been retained in Eastern European construction of socialism, and he was restrained in his comments on the possibility of averting war. He refused to accept the Yugoslav rapprochement as a contribution to socialism, presumably because, as he reportedly once charged, the Yugoslav Communist party could not be regarded as doctrinally pure. He went to some pains, however, to praise the successes in socialist building of the Chinese Communists whose doctrinal footwork had been more sure-footed at least through 1955.

24. Kaganovich: During Stalin's lifetime, Kaganovich appeared only once in reported alignments on postwar problems. That one occasion was on the subject of participation in the Marshall Plan, which he allegedly favored. This may have been because of his departmental responsibilities and a hope that the cement industry could be given a much-needed boost. The other possibility is, of course, that the report was wrong. As late as 8 May 1955, long after the need for conformity with the 1947 decision was past, and indeed after the subject had been dropped by other leaders, Kaganovich was insisting that the Marshall Plan had been both a trap and a failure. He told the Czechs:

> After the war they (the American imperialists) came forward with the Marshall Plan.... They managed to make the ruling class of certain countries dependent on them, but they failed and they will never succeed in subjugating the peoples of these countries. I am sure that their assistance to France and to other countries not only failed to sponsor economic development but it undermined even the normal trade relations between countries.

He may have backed the virgin lands gamble and he seemed to be aligned with Bulganin and Khrushchev in the discussion of the imminence of war in 1954. Kaganovich and Molotov were the first leaders to warn publicly against the danger of preoccupation with consumer goods at the expense of heavy industry, and Kaganovich was the only leader besides Khrushchev to remind the party of the continued threat of "capitalist encirclement" in 1954. He reportedly backed the 1955 relaxation in Eastern Europe, but the relaxation of international tension in the same year seems to have been too much for him. With Molotov he fought a losing battle against each step.

His remarks on the Marshall Plan in May 1955 were made at a time when the USSR was reinstating various trade contracts in Western Europe which they had canceled three to four months earlier. They sounded a curiously dour note of distrust of Western economic stability, seeming to hark back with nostalgia to the economic isolationism of the late 40's and were in strong contrast to the Khrushchev line of peaceful coexistence coupled with economic competition.

Despite the warning directed at Molotov in September 1955, Kaganovich's 1955 October Revolution speech was startling in its neglect of the "Geneva spirit" as well as its insistence on Western "contradictions which are growing more acute." "These /US economic/ crisis phenomena did not spread throughout the world, but there are no grounds at the moment for speaking of a real establishment of some balance."

On 25 November 1955, Kaganovich was shorn of one of his honors when the Moscow subway which had been named for him was renamed, leaving him with the faint consolation of one station as his namesake. On the same day Mikoyan received birthday greetings which, [redacted] notably

outranked the one Kaganovich had earlier received. In late November and early December Pravda devoted two editorials to reproof of dogmatists who separate theory from practice and fail to appreciate the need for adjusting tactics to changed conditions. When Bulganin and Khrushchev went to India, Mikoyan appeared to be the caretaker in Moscow. /Kaganovich had officiated while Bulganin and Khrushchev were in Geneva./

[redacted]

At the 20th party congress Kaganovich, with Malenkov, Molotov, Bulganin and Shvernik, referred only to "certain abnormalities" in Stalin's later years which had done "great harm." Kaganovich in particular seemed reluctant to go further, calling the struggle against the cult of personality "no easy question." Where Bulganin emphasized the need for speed in wage reforms and revision of norms, Kaganovich asked for time and careful study of the question. He depicted a "dying and decaying capitalism," a colonial system "bursting at the seams." On the possibility of averting war he echoed Stalin's 19th party congress speech. He omitted Yugoslavia in his bow to national roads to socialism, although he cited China and "the People's Democracies," and his acceptance of parliamentary transition to socialism was equally tepid.

Until he joined with Molotov in resistance to measures to relax international tension, Kaganovich does not appear to have exerted any great degree of personal leadership. After the winter of 1955 he became with Molotov and Voroshilov a symbol of efforts to hold the line in both domestic and foreign affairs.

25. Khrushchev: During Stalin's lifetime, Khrushchev appeared in only two reported postwar policy questions, both in agriculture. In both cases, he was found on the side of change, relying on forms of organization and bigness of operation to ensure progress in agriculture. This concern with form and size was echoed in the virgin lands program of 1954 which not only had the advantage of the dramatic gesture with a possible fast payoff but also increased the proportion of state as opposed to collective farms in the economy. There are also signs of these themes in his theses on the economic reorganization in the USSR, in a tendency to substitute party for ministerial channels and in grandioseness of concept.

Khrushchev seems with the rest of the leadership to have accepted the consumer goods program initially, although his phrasing was more restrained than that of Malenkov or Mikoyan. During the reassessment of nuclear warfare in early 1954,

Khrushchev, Bulganin and Kaganovich took a middle position. Where Malenkov recoiled from the idea of nuclear warfare as unthinkable and therefore not to be prepared for and Molotov refuted the probable extent of destruction, insisting on preparation, Khrushchev seemed to be insisting on preparedness, regardless of whether war was a feasible instrument of foreign policy or not. His estimate of the imminence of war and his concurrent revival of the encirclement theme contrasted strongly with Mikoyan's confidence that war would not come. Whether this indicates a more pacific appraisal by Mikoyan of Western intentions or whether it suggests a greater willingness on Khrushchev's part to contemplate the possibility of war is not clear.

Khrushchev's pronouncements on the probability of war were not as immediately applicable to the Chinese gambit in Indochina as were the "death of civilization" and "death of capitalism" speeches. As has already been noted, however, the area of greatest tension and the most probable source of a clash in 1954 and early 1955 was the Far East. If his speeches are read with a Far Eastern echo, they suggest again a middle ground between Malenkov's revulsion from and Molotov's reaffirmation of Sino-Soviet defense treaty obligations.

By September 1954 it was clear that the combined demands of the consumer goods program, the virgin lands program, defense needs and Chinese Communist demands for economic aid were too great for all to receive top priority. Something had to give, and for Khrushchev it was consumer goods. He made it quite plain, however, that this was a temporary shift and that doctrine to the contrary, the proportion of emphasis on consumer goods might well be increased in further Five-Year Plans. One purely internal goal was to be delayed in favor of another, that of increased agricultural production, together with a defense program which would enable the USSR to conduct a foreign policy in the direction either of conciliation or war, and economic aid to the fraternal Chinese. Which of these latter three factors weighed most heavily is impossible at this point to say. The choice of which internal goal to sacrifice was made easy for him--he had authored one, Malenkov was closely identified with another, and Malenkov was a rival.

With the change in defense priorities accomplished, Khrushchev embarked on a more flexible foreign policy from a military position of strength. Unlike Molotov, his "risks" in foreign policy consisted of wooing possible allies rather than stonewalling them, abandoning a few unproductive positions and risking the blurring of ideological purity in the

hope of greater gains in Soviet influence internationally. His choice of tactics may have been dictated in part of a recognition that some additional over-all relaxation of tension was desirable since the stonewalling had proved both dangerous and unproductive, and in part by a decision to move against another rival in an area in which the latter seemed vulnerable. Malenkov had been cut down to size; Molotov was next.

By May 1955, Khrushchev had joined Malenkov in calling peaceful coexistence of the socialist and capitalist systems not only possible but necessary. There was nothing unaggressive about the new foreign policy, however, despite its conciliatory air. Certain unproductive positions of hostility to capitalism were dropped. These involved the Austrian Treaty question, disarmament negotiations and, according to the July 1957 charges against Molotov, the normalization of relations with Japan. The concept of struggle was by no means abandoned but merely transferred to the slightly less inflammable fields of ideas and trade. And, to balance these semiretreats, Soviet influence was to be expanded into new areas in excolonial countries by an economic aid program and by judicious appeals to the established governments regardless of their political complexions. His special interest in this program is suggested by the fact that at the 20th party congress Khrushchev was the only one who noted that excolonial countries can "now" draw on the achievements of the socialist camp.

Khrushchev's gambling instincts and his fervent optimism have apparently enabled him to accept with equanimity the risks of new clashes which this expansion may entail. War is to be avoided--the possibility of doing so is real--but if it comes let it be on a new and more productive issue. Communism is after all the future.

In internationalism, too, he seems to have held to a middle ground between Malenkov's isolationism and Mikoyan's free-wheeling tolerance of foreign influences. Khrushchev recognized the needs both economic and politico-military to the Chinese Communists; under his aegis Mikoyan launched his charges of economic exploitation of the satellites; and Khrushchev was among the first to push for liberalization of Soviet controls in the satellites.

If the Poles are to be believed, however, he showed qualms about the growth of national characteristics which broke with the Soviet mold at a time when Mikoyan was still enthusiastically calling for further liberalization.

His retreat from Stalinism was exactly that, a retreat rather than an escape. He did not denounce Stalin, even secretly, until Mikoyan had done so publicly on a substantive point, and his denunciation when it came was primarily of the tragic irony of Stalin's mistaken belief that he had to destroy loyal comrades for the good of the socialist cause.

There have been somewhat caustic comments reported from the Poles that Khrushchev is no theoretician. He showed scant regard for doctrine in his three "new possibilities" at the 20th party congress, "creatively applying" it in tactics as the situation seemed to him to warrant. For Khrushchev's purposes Sukarno's overthrow by revolution and replacement with a Communist leadership is not immediately necessary when a little economic aid and a lot of personal flattery will at a minimum deny him to the West as a trustworthy ally. The doctrinal problem can be dealt with later of whether Sukarno and his office should be regarded as representative of a brand of capitalism even though Indonesian independence from the Netherlands has been announced, or whether as a native leader of a newly independent excolonial country he can be regarded as representing national interests. In his own field of agriculture, however, Khrushchev has shown a continuing concern for orthodoxy in organizational forms, he has retained the classic concept of strife and struggle against capitalism, and he has reiterated again and again his concern lest political coexistence be extended to ideological coexistence. He seems willing to experiment tactically with doctrinal changes until these shifts threaten ground already gained when he reverts to orthodoxy.

26. Mikoyan: Mikoyan appears in the postwar years to have had a wider tolerance for new ideas regardless of their doctrinal orthodoxy and a stronger bent toward internationalism than any of the other leaders. The result combined with confidence verging on the venturesome has made for some very curious bedfellows for him.

During Stalin's lifetime, when the issues turned on varying estimates of capitalist strength, Mikoyan appeared consistently to accept Varga's unorthodox estimate of relative strength. His reaction to this strength in 1946 differed from Malenkov's, in the same way that their reactions to the 1954 assessment of nuclear warfare differed. In 1946 Zhdanov was insisting that capitalism was relatively weak. Malenkov saw it as still relatively strong and planned to retire into the fortress of the Soviet homeland in a state of siege. Mikoyan too accepted Varga's estimate of the continuing relative strength of capitalism but proposed to build a bastion of socialism in the occupied territories to meet the capitalist enemy.

In the spring of 1954 when Malenkov seemed to be arguing that nuclear warfare made the Chinese Communist gamble in Indochina and, indeed, any war too risky to contemplate, and Molotov was retorting that the destruction entailed in nuclear warfare would not be greater than the Soviet Union could afford, Mikoyan seemed to be reassuring them both that it would not come to war on a major scale. He made his thesis explicit two years later at the 20th party congress where he stated that the imperialists were restrained from launching World War III by Soviet possession of the atomic and hydrogen bombs and capability to deliver them.

If participation in the new-fangled gadget of the Marshall Plan (which would not collapse, despite Molotov's direful prophesies) could be turned to the advantage of socialism, well and good. There was nothing in foreignness to daunt an Armenian working in a Russian government to build an international socialist system in polyglot Eastern Europe.

When Stalin died and the need for added emphasis on consumer goods was generally recognized, it was Mikoyan, ever receptive to change, who went further than any other speaker in hailing "a new stage" in the development of the Soviet economy which would allow a forced pace for the production of consumer goods.

During 1954 Mikoyan had little or nothing to say on the subject of defense needs, although his 1956 claims for the deterrent power of Soviet military strength suggest that he may have been concerned earlier. He was clearly identified with economic aid to China in the fall of 1954 and he seems at the same time to have backed Khrushchev in the virgin lands program. As in the case of Khrushchev, it is difficult at this point to determine which of the latter three priority claims weighed more in Mikoyan's mind in dropping or delaying the consumer goods program.

Mikoyan was reported among the leaders who showed an early interest in China, he made reassuring noises during the Far Eastern tension of early 1954, he accompanied Bulganin and Khrushchev on their gift-bearing junket in the fall of that year, he was identified with an interest in economic aid to Egypt as early as February 1954, he has been frequently identified [redacted] with the Yugoslav rapprochement and with the ensuing liberalization in Eastern Europe, and he toured Southeast Asia in early 1956 bearing gifts and offers of economic aid. In the Eastern European liberalization he has been reported as playing a leading role in criticism of

past Soviet economic policies as "mean." In September 1956, Khrushchev appeared to be having qualms concerning the growing centrifugal tendencies in the satellites, reportedly telling Tito that the CPSU must naturally maintain primacy and other Communist parties must continue to look to it for leadership and warning him of the dangers to communism inherent in Yugoslav collaboration with the West. [redacted] alleges that at that time there were three definite groups in the Kremlin--the Stalinists led by Molotov, Khrushchev's "thaw" group and a group led by Mikoyan advocating far-reaching democratization exceeding anything envisioned by the middle ground of the "thaw" group.

[redacted]

Mikoyan's 20th party congress speech was characteristic of his internationalism and his confident acceptance of new ideas. He was the only one publicly to criticize Stalin on a substantive issue. He alone praised the liquidation of military bases in China and Finland, liquidation of "the isolation of Soviet public and state organizations from the outer world. The time is past when the Soviet land of socialism was isolated and when we were an oasis in the capitalist encirclement. Now there is no question of it." He complained that the USSR was seriously lagging behind in its study of contemporary capitalism, and lamented the abolition of research institutes both in this field and in oriental studies.

A State Department study of his 20th party congress treatment of the wage problem concluded that he was more egalitarian in his approach than any of the other speakers. Only Mikoyan

and Saburov cited the split of GOSPLAN into long and short-range planning groups as a major achievement, and Mikoyan followed this up with a plea for improved statistical work in the USSR, again showing an interest in ideas, not rules.

27. Zhukov: Zhukov's appearance in policy questions have been rare. He is reported to have opposed the stripping policy in the early postwar years. Opposition to withdrawal from territories won in war is not surprising from a military leader. There is a suggestion that he may have been discussing the "death of civilization" problem in the late spring of 1955, but by this time Khrushchev had joined Malenkov in insisting that war can and must be prevented, and only Molotov, Voroshilov and possibly Kaganovich were opposing efforts to relax international tension. In the summer of 1955 both Tito and Kardelj stated that Zhukov was personally responsible for proposing the Soviet-Yugoslav talks leading to a rapprochement.

[redacted] Zhukov was said to be isolating the Soviet army from interference or involvement in current questions. That he wished to avoid a repetition of the 1954-55 discussions of who contributed most to victory in World War II is quite probable. [redacted] that Zhukov was opposing Rokossovski's efforts to follow Zhukov's example" in Poland by attempting to get rid of Witazewski's political management of the Polish armed forces.

The Soviet army's natural preference for maximum Soviet controls, both political and military, over the Polish armed forces on its doorstep would align Zhukov willy-nilly with either Khrushchev's "thaw group" or possibly even the Molotov Stalinists on this particular question. His waiting game may have consisted of refusing involvement in other questions in which the army did not have a clear professional stake.

The fleeting glimpse gained here suggests a middle-of-the-roader somewhat like Khrushchev's past performances. In addition to his canny balancing ability, however, Khrushchev likes gambles and drama. Whether Zhukov shares these tendencies with him is not yet clear.

28. Other Ranks: In addition to the major figures seen in the preceding pages, there have been fragmentary glimpses of minor members of the leadership group, some junior in age and rank, others like Bulganin and Voroshilov senior in age and rank but junior in the force of the leadership they seem to exert.

Bulganin, despite his position, has not emerged as much more than an echo for Khrushchev in the initiation of policies. His phrasing in the early months of the consumer goods program was correct but not enthusiastic. He did not appear at all in the agricultural problem. In February 1954, Khrushchev cited the continuing danger of capitalist encirclement in urging the cause of defense expenditures. Mikoyan in March 1954 contended that the danger of war had decreased. Bulganin in the same month warned:

> We cannot assume that the imperialists are spending vast sums on armaments merely to frighten us. Nor can we reckon on the humaneness of the imperialists who, as life has shown, are capable of using any weapons of mass destruction.

In June 1954 he repeated this theme:

> It is obvious that until the US renounces the use of atomic and hydrogen weapons the Soviet Union is forced to possess these weapons so as not to be left without weapons in case of surprise.

With Molotov, Mikoyan and Khrushchev, he was identified with early recognition of China and he accompanied the latter two on their economic aid trip to China in the fall of 1954. From early 1955 onward, the Bulganin and Khrushchev team assumed the aspect of Siamese twins. His 20th party congress speech provided correct if uninspired support for Khrushchev's three "new possibilities" and he reserved his real force for a somewhat specialized problem--that of "an unscientific theory to the effect that there is no moral depreciation of machinery under socialism."

Voroshilov in November 1953 described the consumer goods and agricultural programs together in restrained and undramatic terms. With Molotov he insisted in March 1954 that World War III would mean the "death of capitalism" in contrast

to Malenkov's "destruction of world civilization" speech; with Molotov he provided a step-by-step resistance to the measures to relax international tension in the spring of 1955 and to liberalization in Eastern Europe in the same year. At the 20th party congress he lauded the principle of collective leadership but made no reference to any previous "irregularities." Khrushchev in his secret speech called upon Voroshilov by name to cast aside his inhibitions and admit the existence of Stalin's faults. Like Molotov, he seems in the post-Stalin years to have been among those who saw no need for new methods since the old ones had served well.

Suslov's first appearance in policy issues was in the fall of 1952 when his own record was apparently sufficiently clean for him to reprimand Shepilov for the latter's involvement with Voznesensky in 1949. In 1950 he was, with Malenkov, Kosygin and Beria, among the less enthusiastic in greeting the birth of the CPR. He is reported to have accepted the need for the relaxation measures of 1955, both in the international field and in Eastern Europe. At the 20th party congress he was among the most vigorous in indirect denunciation of Stalin's later practices, but he was tepid in his acceptance of Khrushchev's three "new possibilities." He echoed Khrushchev's criticism of the benighted economists who had advocated slowing the growth of heavy industry, and he repeated Bulganin's criticism of some economists on the non-obsolescence of machinery. As had been foreshadowed by his restraint at the congress, Suslov appears to have been an active member of the "Stalinist" group in 1956 in emphasizing the monolithic character of international communism, demanding controls to counteract the centrifugal force of national communism.

Shepilov appears to have begun as a Voznesensky enthusiast, gravitating naturally from there to the optimistic and venturesome Khrushchev. His 20th party congress speech showed one curious omission which may have foreshadowed his appearance with Molotov in the "antiparty group" of June 1957. Despite the fact that he was to be assigned less than six months later to foreign affairs, he failed to make even a pro forma reference to Khrushchev's "new possibility" of averting war or to the possibility of coexistence.

Saburov's sporadic appearances in policy issues seem to have followed Malenkov's lead, in the stripping problem, in the Voznesensky issue, in the consumer goods program, and in

the 1954 dispute over defense needs. He continued to omit any reference to defense needs in his speeches as late as November 1954.

[redacted]

At the 20th party congress he repeated Mikoyan's praise of the reorganization of GOSPLAN into long and short-range planning groups and urged the "obvious need" to grant the Councils of Ministers of the union republics wider control over the development of the entire economy of their territories. He noted that the right of ministries and heads of departments had already been extended, charging that some ministries (presumably taking advantage of these extensions) were displaying a narrow departmental approach and demanding increases in manpower and wage funds.

Pervukhin's name does not appear in reports on policy issues until after Stalin's death when with Malenkov and Mikoyan he seemed among the more enthusiastic proponents of the consumer goods program. Like Malenkov and Saburov, he omitted the subject of defense needs from his election speech in March 1954, but when Malenkov retracted on the "death of civilization" in April 1954, Pervukhin added his voice to the call for strengthening the armed forces. Like Saburov, he expressed concern in July 1955 over indecision on economic directives and the possibility of serious repercussions from a failure at the summit conference. At the 20th party congress, foreshadowing the December 1956 plenum decisions, Pervukhin criticized the dispersion of capital investment on large numbers of items for lengthy periods of construction as unproductive expenditure of state funds. He charged that the Ministry of Finance was delaying in broadening the powers of directors of enterprises, and criticzed the Ministry of State Control for reporting voluminously on a wide range of questions without effectively checking on the implementation of government and central committee instructions.